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articles:human_factors [2022/02/26 12:29] – [Are nonconformities resulting from Human Factors "Common Cause" or "Special (Assignable) Cause" Variations?] rrandall | articles:human_factors [2023/03/09 08:46] (current) – [Are nonconformities resulting from Human Factors "Common Cause" or "Special (Assignable) Cause" Variations?] rrandall | ||
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- | Since human factors are mentioned in 10.2, many assume that they are required to eliminate root causes associated with human factors. In the vast majority of cases, this is not true. I recommend reading the AMT (FAA " | + | Since human factors are mentioned in AS 9100, sec. 10.2, many assume that it is required to eliminate root causes associated with human factors. In the vast majority of cases, this is not true. I recommend reading the AMT (FAA " |
The AMT Handbook: Chapter 14, Human Factors, can be downloaded from: | The AMT Handbook: Chapter 14, Human Factors, can be downloaded from: | ||
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{{ : | {{ : | ||
- | <note tip>An excellent source of news and information about Aviation-related Human Factors is the " | + | <WRAP center round tip 80%> |
+ | An excellent source of news and information about Aviation-related Human Factors is the " | ||
+ | </WRAP> | ||
===== Are nonconformities resulting from Human Factors " | ===== Are nonconformities resulting from Human Factors " | ||
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^ Action | ^ Action | ||
- | | Fuse box lock-out procedures so that power cannot be turned on before an electrical repair is complete and all personnel are out of harm's way. | Risk Mitigation (because | + | | Fuse box lock-out procedures so that power cannot be turned on before an electrical repair is complete and all personnel are out of harm's way. | Risk Mitigation (making it difficult for workers to unknowingly re-introduce electrical power) | |
| Guide pins to guarantee proper alignment. | | Guide pins to guarantee proper alignment. | ||
- | | Color-coding of components that otherwise look similar. | + | | Color-coding of components that otherwise look similar. |
- | | Bins of parts that are electronically connected to the bill of materials through a bar code scanner, so that only the proper bin door opens for a given product. | + | | Bins of parts that are electronically connected to the bill of materials through a barcode |
One of the most common failed attempts at error proofing we see appears in documents, e-mails & text messages. Of course, I'm speaking of the auto-spell correction. These have resulted in some hilarious memes. These are much better described as "risk mitigation" | One of the most common failed attempts at error proofing we see appears in documents, e-mails & text messages. Of course, I'm speaking of the auto-spell correction. These have resulted in some hilarious memes. These are much better described as "risk mitigation" | ||
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- | ===== What about "Zero Defects"? | ||
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- | A common point of conflict between quality professionals is whether the "Zero Defects" | ||
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- | “Zero Defects” is a // | ||
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- | However, the “Zero Defects” concept didn’t gain widespread popularity until it was promoted by Philip B. Crosby in his book “// | ||
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- | This is diametrically opposed to the philosophy and teachings of W. Edwards Deming, who repeatedly showed that, no matter how vigilant the employees, every process contains inherent (i.e., natural “Common Cause”) variations resulting in defects. This was most popularly demonstrated through Deming’s “[[https:// | ||
- | When performing causal analysis, we must be able to identify and link an “assignable cause” to a problem in order to have a “root cause”. “Assignable Causes” can often be eliminated (e.g., through corrective action). However, when unable to identify and clearly link an “assignable cause” to a problem, we must recognize and acknowledge that those variations are most likely inherent to the process and cannot be eliminated; without completely re-engineering that process. And re-engineering a process may be cost-prohibitive… or impossible (e.g., due to technical constraints/ | ||
- | And in the quality profession, none may be more entrenched than the concept of “Root Cause Analysis”. This term alone establishes an unrealistic expectation that every problem has an assignable root cause that can be eliminated. However, to suggest (or imply) that all defects are the result of an “assignable cause” is to dismiss all that we’ve learned from Walter Shewhart & W. Edwards Deming! |