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articles:using_red_team_vs_blue_team_to_improve_quality [2023/02/20 10:21] – [The Tools] rrandall | articles:using_red_team_vs_blue_team_to_improve_quality [2023/02/20 10:39] – [The Tools] rrandall |
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__Red Team Tools__ \\ | __Red Team Tools__ \\ |
Upon being trained in the use of FMEAs (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), pessimistic/negative people are often very good at estimating risk probability and severity. | Upon being trained in the use of FMEAs (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), pessimistic/negative people are often very good at assessing risk probability and severity. Whether risks are identified and handled through an FMEA, a Risk Matrix or any other tools is dependent upon the preference of the team. Ultimately, once a tool is selected, it must be used consistently by the team. There should be some lively discussions/debates relating to topics such as whether a RPN (Risk Priority Number) is useful, whether "Detection" should be included in determining the RPN (or whether it is simply a component of the risk mitigation put into place), how the RPN is different from determining "Risk Tolerance", how "Risk Tolerance" levels should be categorized, etc. |
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__Blue Team Tools__ \\ | __Blue Team Tools__ \\ |
In order to find a solution to a problem, the Blue Team MUST first distill the high-level problem down to its constituent, individual "causes" – using one or more "Cause and Effect Chain" (CEC) analysis methods (e.g., 5 Whys, [[articles:those_who_fail_to_plan|Ishikawa (fishbone) diagrams]], Apollo RCA, Fault Tree analysis). | In order to find a solution to a problem, the Blue Team MUST first distill the high-level problem down to its constituent, individual "causes" – using one or more "Cause and Effect Chain" (CEC) analysis methods (e.g., 5 Whys, [[articles:those_who_fail_to_plan|Ishikawa (fishbone) diagrams]], Apollo RCA, Fault Tree analysis). |
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Once the individual causes and any contributing factors are identified, these can be assessed and categorized as "common cause" or "assignable cause" variations in the process. | Once the individual causes and any contributing factors are identified, these can be assessed and categorized as "common cause" or "assignable cause" variations in the process. Common cause variations can only be eliminated through fundamental changes in the process (e.g., using different or more modern equipment) OR a re-design of a product (e.g., combining or eliminating parts). Most often, emphasis should be placed on identifying and implementing risk mitigation (and counter-measures. |
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addressed individually. | |
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